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CHAPTER 13
Modern Fixed and Mobile
Coastal Defence
M
ODERN FIXED AND MOBILE
shore-based coastal defences
represent an attempt to square the circle of providing effec-
tive cover over, if not over a whole coastline, then certainly
its most vulnerable or important points - and at the lowest
cost. Essentially the choices involved in stationary or
mobile coast defence from the shore involve educated
guesswork about where an enemy or potential adversary
might choose to strike.
The irony of successful deterrence is that one can never
know precisely what elements of a deterrent package might
have swayed an adversary's decision not to attack,
but
clearly there are some obvious probabilities. The geography
of Scandinavia favours the defender and the strategically
significant fjord or skerry can be protected with moderate
ease against all but the most determined attacker by the
usual combination of mines, shore-fired torpedoes and
SSMs - provided that control of the air can at least be
contested. Major ports and naval forces are obvious defence
priorities, as are exposed coastlines within a manageable
distance of a key objective - such as a capital city - but
otherwise the defender has in the past always had more 'key
points' to defend than reasonably sized forces with which to
shield them.
What has radically altered this assessment of the classic
coast defence dilemma is the appearance of the SSM.
Whereas torpedoes and coastal artillery - mobile or not -
can only provide protection out to at most a few tens of
kilometres, some SSMs can reach out to 150km, completely
altering the balance
1
in favour of the well-equipped and
astute defender - provided he can protect both this asset
and the means of target detection and fire control from
attack.
Lessons learned from post-1945 experiences of coastal
defence have generally confirmed the validity of the above
analysis. When coastal defence or, as in Normandy in 1944,
the ability to respond quickly failed, the results were cata-
strophic. MacArthur's landing at Inchon in 1950, which so
completely turned the tables against the outflanked North
Koreans, is an obvious case in point. It is perhaps less fair to
criticise the Egyptian performance against the Anglo-
French forces in 1956, although some of the usual measures
such as the sinking of blockships were used. It was no
accident though that, after Suez, Nasser made sure that
Egypt was well-equipped with Soviet-supplied coast de-
fence missiles and long range guns.
There was little opportunity for classic coast defence op-
erations in most of the brush-fire wars of the 1960s to 1990s,
although the mere threat of attack from the sea apparently
played an major role in misleading Saddam Hussein about
the Allied coalition's intentions in 1991. The mere presence
of substantial US Marine landing forces was enough to pro-
voke the laying of thousands of mines off Kuwait, many of
which still lurk in the shallows outside those channels
which were cleared by coalition mine hunters.
An opportunity for the classic application of coast defence
disciplines presented itself to the hapless Argentineans de-
fending the Falkland Islands during their brief occupation
in 1982. The problem, as ever in coast defence, was that
there were simply not enough troops and equipment. The
Falklands conflict is the most interesting recent example of
the opportunities presented, and challenges faced, in
attempting to mount any kind of viable coast defence.
Thus the settlement at San Carlos was indeed identified
by the Argentines as a possible landing point, but the forces
available to harass the British landing on 21 May were
meagre, comprising just sixty-two men, two 106mm recoil-
less guns and two 81mm mortars at Fanning Head, a tower-
ing headland overlooking the approach to the landing
beaches. This well-positioned, if small, sub-company
strength force was dislodged by a cleverly devised combina-
tion of attack and negotiation involving the Royal Marines'
Special Boat Service.
What is worth remembering about this skirmish in which
the British prevailed is that had those two Argentine guns
and two mortars been brought to bear on the ships quietly
sailing into San Carlos Water, there is no doubt that they
could have done incalculable damage - out of all propor-
tions to the size of the Argentine force engaged. After all,
the Argentines would have learned precisely this lesson a
month and a half before when, on 3 April 1982, their cor-
vette
Guerrko
was badly damaged at South Georgia by a
combination of withering small arms fire and 84mm and
66mm anti-tank rockets, all in the hands of a tiny 22-strong
Royal Marines garrison.
A third engagement during the Falklands conflict is also
of crucial relevance to this narrative as it was the first known
occasion when an SSM was fired against a warship from a
land site. On 13 June, following an earlier failed attempt to
attack British ships bombarding Port Stanley on 27-28 May,
a jury-rigged twin MM38 Exocet SSM installation mounted
on a trailer engaged the
County
class destroyer
Glamorgan.
An Exocet caused severe damage to the ship, whose crew
knew of the Exocet threat but miscalculated its range. The
author has heard that the mistake was described by an ob-
server afterwards as a case of 'cutting across the penalty
area'. The war ended on the next day, but it is tempting to
conclude that the 'gun line' of warships bombarding Port
Stanley might have been withdrawn to a slightly safer dis-
tance had the war continued.
1
Interestingly, the British learned the lesson and after the
war contracted Vosper Thornycroft to devise a trailer-
mounted twin MM38 Exocet launcher called Excalibur,
which was installed for a few years at Gibraltar. The trailer
had an integral Type 1006 radar and power generation, but
the mounting is understood to have now been withdrawn
from Gibraltar.
Weapons like the shore-based versions of Exocet and
Harpoon, with essentially the same characteristics as their
shipborne variants, clearly represent the most potent shore-
based coast defence solution currently available, although
heavy artillery is another, while a third approach - so far not
yet widely adopted - is unguided rocketry.
In no country, except perhaps the Scandinavian nations,
is coast defence taken so seriously that it is regarded as a
primary mission of the armed forces. It is thus not surprising
that it has been in Scandinavia that the most coherent,
rational approach to the problem has been taken, with
impressive results given these countries' severely squeezed
defence budgets.
Sweden has one of the most developed coast defence
systems of any country in the world today, and perhaps the
best equipped. The Coastal Artillery is a separate arm of
service within the navy and as such is equipped, not only
with both coastal artillery and missiles, but also with its own
dedicated fleet of patrol craft, minelayers and, of crucial
importance to the provision of mobile coastal defence, am-
phibious vessels.
Coastal Defence 120 mm emplacement. Another
Swedish concept, now in service, is the Bofors 120
mm 62 cal ERSTA installation. The magazine
servicing and gun-cooling arrangement can be seen
in this cutaway
The gunnery has been extensively modernised and com-
prises the Bofors 120mm 62cal ERSTA turret in fixed
mountings, supplemented by fixed 75mm mountings. The
ERSTA turret has a maximum 27km range, which like the
75mm fixed guns fire from well-concealed turrets disguised
to appear like rocky outcrops. A deep magazine and servic-
ing and cooling system lie beneath the ERSTA turret,
which draws target information from a NobelTech 9 KM
400 surveillance radar.
Significant though these fixed guns are for Sweden's de-
fence, the provision of mobile weaponry is an increasing
trend and these assets comprise 120mm guns including
Bofors CD-80 Karin guns, 55cal weapons which have been
specially designed for the coastal defence role, as well as
75mm and 40mm AA guns. Supporting them are 81mm
mortars for close-range defence. The Karin fires the same
shell as the ERSTA turret but an enhanced range shell
which can reach out to 30km is also available.
A very important future coast defence project is the
STARKA system being developed by NobelTech for both
the Swedish and Norwegian coastal artillery for service from
1997-98. This will use mobile 155mm howitzers firing from
pre-prepared positions, from which they can swiftly with-
draw, either to other positions or to safer cliffside hides. A
request for studies went out to industry in February-March
1992. They began in the following April and the project
moved on surprisingly quickly given its sheer complexity.
Trials of appropriate systems were intended to be complete
by June 1995, to be followed by production orders for the
self-propelled artillery. Sweden's Bofors, France's GIAT
and Britain's VSEL have all showed interest in providing
the armament. Assuming the project is funded, the
howitzers are likely to be 39cal weapons, although longer 48
cal or the future NATO long range standard of 52cal, had
not been ruled out.
2
Sweden's coastal defence missile arsenal is truly formid-
able. For long-range protection, there is the Saab
RBS-15KA SSM fired from a four-round truck launcher,
plus the RBS-08A and RB-52 SSMs, the latter being
French-supplied SS-11 wire-guided missiles which are
being replaced for close-range defence by the Rockwell
AGM-114A Hellfire - known to the Swedes as the RBS-17.
This provides a form of coastal defence which can be car-
ried and deployed by one man. Some 700 were originally
ordered in 1987, with ninety launchers, to equip twenty-five
battalions to replace the thirty-two RB52 battalions.
The RBS-15KA is identical to the ship-launched version,
being powered by two booster rockets and a Microturbo
TR160 turbojet, and has a maximum range of 100km. The
missile's resistance to countermeasures has been improved
under a mid-life update contract awarded in 1991. The
RBS-17 Hellfire, marketed by Rockwell as Shore Defence
Hellfire, is a lightweight man-portable weapon system
derived from the anti-tank missile. Besides the modified
missile itself, the system consists of an El Op Portable
Advanced Laser (PAL) designator with an 8km range for
targeting, a compact, foldable tripod launcher, and launch
control equipment. The missile itself has a blast fragmenta-
tion warhead instead of the anti-armour warhead of the air-
launched Hellfire and its autopilot is also modified to allow
it to be fired at a 10 or 20 degree elevation, instead of the
horizontal of an anti-tank helicopter's weapon pylon. The
RBS-17 can lock on to its target before or after launch.
Finally, naval craft in Swedish Coastal Artillery service
currently consist of a fleet of nine coastal and sixteen
inshore minelayers, plus eighteen patrol craft and no less
than 150 landing craft of various types to move troops and
artillery around the densely island-strewn Swedish archi-
pelago. All of these coast defence assets are organised into
six coastal artillery brigades within which there are fifty-
three static defence and a dozen mobile units, including
amphibious defence and minelaying formations.
In the late 1980s Norway decided to overhaul its elderly
coast defence network and in June 1990 a contract was
awarded by the Royal Norwegian Navy's Material Com-
mand to Norsk Forsvarsteknologi (NFT) to modernise all
the minefields and torpedo batteries at the Norwegian
Coastal Artillery's fortresses along Norway's very long coast-
line. Nine controlled minefields and shore-mounted
torpedo batteries are being modernised and three more are
being added, these minefields and torpedoes all being
controlled from the fortresses, the last of which will be
complete in June 1997. The programme involves the mod-
ernisation of five minefields and four torpedo batteries, with
the addition of two new minefields at Namsen Fjord and in
Tromso and one more torpedo battery at Namsen Fjord at a
total cost of NKr 700 million ($93 million). The first of the
modernised complexes was being readied at the time of
writing near Bergen.
The minefields are receiving a new weapons control sys-
tem based on NFT's KMC 9000 tactical fire control console
with new Saab electro-optical and Terma radar sensors. The
existing mines are being modernised with new sensors and
command and communication systems. Safety for innocent
shipping is a priority and the mines can be automatically
deactivated when required.
The torpedoes will similarly be modernised, as will their
loading and mid-course correction arrangements and the
above-water tubes will be replaced by submerged ones. All
these minefields and torpedo batteries are also being pro-
vided with new communications equipment and a complete
training package. Incredibly, the Norwegians still use not
only the venerable British Mk8 torpedo for coastal defence,
but also the Tl, a Norwegian-built, German-designed G-7a
of 1940s vintage. It is not clear if these weapons will remain
in service beyond the completion of the new programme;
Norway is a Tp61 user, its variant being the Tp617, and it
would seem logical to standardise on this 533mm weapon.
Unofficial sources quoted in 1992 said that Norway then
had twenty-six coastal fortresses and fifty artillery batteries
and there were still twenty-six coastal fortresses in early
1995, equipped with 75mm, 90mm, 105mm, 120mm,
127mm and 150mm guns. The 105mm and 150mm are Ger-
man relics of the Second World War which have been
modernised. The further modernisation of the rest of
Norwegian coastal artillery has involved the installation of
Bofors 120mm ERSTA guns and new 90mm guns, plus AA
defences which include 20mm armoured turrets from NFT
which use Rheinmetall Rh 202 20mm guns. This remark-
able little turret, with 360 degree traverse and 50 degree
elevation, has a 150 degree field of view and a sight with 8x
magnification.
Norway may also benefit in 1997-98 from the afore-
mentioned joint Swedish-Norwegian STARKA project for
new mobile 155mm artillery, for which the Norwegian
designation is IM-battery. However at the time of writing
there was some uncertainty over Norwegian commitment to
further coastal defence expenditure. Coastal protection is
not cheap: in 1992 the cost of a Norwegian coastal fort was
officially stated to be NKr 819 million or $160 million, pro-
viding an indicator of the investment involved. Strangely,
one weapon which has not yet entered service with Nor-
way's coastal defences is NFT's Penguin SSM, although
the Norwegian Defence Ministry has looked at launcher
options including a truck launcher with six missiles. The
weapon is in very widespread use on sundry Norwegian
FACs and on F-16A/B fighters. In the coast defence role,
Penguin Mk.2 could achieve a range of between 25 and
27km.
One other Scandinavian country which does use shore-
fired SSMs though is Denmark, which as already mentioned
has two batteries of 100km+ range McDonnell Douglas
Harpoon lCs taken from the decommissioned 1960s-built
frigates
Niels Juel
and
Herluf Trolle.
Danish company NEA
Lindberg designed and manufactured the specialist equip-
ment used in this conversion. Each battery comprises two
Scania launch vehicles with quad launchers plus a Scania
command vehicle, all these vehicles towing their own gen-
erators on support trailers.
Otherwise Denmark still retains coastal artillery at Stevns
and Langeland forts, where often 150mm guns taken from
German battleships, four at Stevns fort are in two twin
SKC/28 mountings taken from the
Gneisenau.
These forts
were reduced to reserve status in 1983 but are put through
their paces by reservists once a year, firing live ammunition
and supported by coastal radar networks. One 1994 report
said only one fort was still operational while another said
Denmark still uses ex-US 3in (76mm) 50cal naval mount-
ings for coastal defence. There were also six other forts until
recently equipped with a wide range of artillery including
210mm, 170mm, 150mm, 120mm and 105mm with, until
1983, 40mm guns for protection against air threats.
Hellfire
The lightest current coastal
defence missile system is the
Hellfire, from McDonnell
Douglas. A variant of the
helicopter-fired anti-tank
missile, the Shore Defence
Hellfire is now in service
with the Swedish Coastal
Artillery (McDonnell
Douglas)
Finland, like its Scandinavian neighbours, has always re-
spected the usefulness of coastal defence and today fields
five RBS-15KA quad launchers, plus copious static artillery,
comprising 170 M-54 130mm guns, M-60 122mm and D-
10T 100mm tank turrets (from decommissioned T-55
tanks), organised in two army coast artillery regiments and
three independent battalions, one of them mobile.
3
The emphasis on coastal defence shown by Scandinavian
countries is still shared by a surprisingly large number of
countries, although this is still mainly a preoccupation of the
major powers, several European nations and a handful of
Latin American and Asian states. In Africa for example, only
one sub-Saharan country, Angola, is known to possess a
coastal defence system - with a Soviet-supplied SS-C-1
Sepal battery at Luanda. Cost is clearly an obvious factor in
discouraging the acquisition of specialised coast defence
capabilities in Africa.
Similarly, in the rest of Western Europe beyond Scan-
dinavia, only Spain and Portugal have dedicated coast
defence units. Portugal's are equipped with six 234mm,
9.2in Vickers pattern weapons installed in the 1950s
(Ireland's 9.2in guns and their 1938 vintage shells were kept
in working order as late as the early 1980s).
Meanwhile Spain still has a galaxy of coastal artillery in
two groups in the Balearics and at her North African
enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, with other guns stationed
near the strait of Gibraltar - what the Spanish call 'el
Estrecho'. These units have seventeen Vickers Model 1926
381mm 45cal (15in)
,
sixteen Vickers Model 1912 305mm
50cal ( 1 2 i n ) and ninety-seven 152mm. The 305mm guns
were removed from the previously described small battle-
ships
Espana
and
Jaime I
upon decommissioning. Eight are
stationed near the straits at Punta Paloma Baja, Punta
Caraminal and at Cadiz/San Fernando. Also guarding the
straits are two 381mm (15in) at Punta Paloma Alta - the
largest such artillery still in use anywhere.
4
Elsewhere in Europe - besides Turkey's 1950s-supplied
9.2in (234mm) guns - coast defence is only of interest to the
former Warsaw Pact. Bulgaria has two regiments and twenty
batteries with 150 100mm and four SM-4-1 130mm, plus
Above: STARKA
The Swedish Coastal Artillery’s STARKA concept under study from 1992,
which has also been offered to Norway, is based on the premise that future
coastal artillery will service longer if it is mobile. Self propelled artillery can
suddenly emerge and then withdraw after firing.
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